A union of shifting coalitions
Heather Grabbe is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform, an independent think tank in London (www.cer.org.uk).
A year from now, Poland will be a member of the EU, assuming enough voters turn out and say Yes in the forthcoming referendum. But what kind of union will the country join? Many different, confusing pictures of the enlarged EU are appearing in the European and American press. What kind of EU can Polish voters expect?
Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. defense secretary, confidently predicted a division between an anti-American "old Europe," based on the countries that opposed the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and a pro-American "new Europe," including the EU's new members. Some French and German politicians and commentators expect the same kind of divide. They would like to deepen cooperation between the oldest members of the EU - including Belgium and Luxembourg - to form a "core group" within the enlarged union. The idea is that this group will pursue special projects of its own, which the other countries will not necessarily join.
But both Rumsfeld and the proponents of a European "hard core" are likely to be proved wrong. Once the union expands to 25 countries in 2004, the ties between member states will not be based just on geography, size or attitudes to the U.S. The political dynamic of the union will change after enlargement. Rather than permanent alliances of countries forming power blocs within the union, the pattern is much more likely to be fluid coalitions. Countries will get together where they have common interests on a particular issue, rather than because of special friendships. On other foreign policy questions, on economic policy, and on reform of the union, alliances in Europe will depend on shifting constellations that vary, issue by issue.
Until the early 1990s, a Franco-German deal was the necessary and sufficient condition for any initiative to move ahead. These two countries represented the main divisions in the union - between North and South, East and West, industrial and agricultural, federalist and intergovernmentalist. A deal between them could thus serve as a compromise between the other competing interests in the union. They were also ambitious: most of the EU's major projects originated in a Franco-German initiative, from the single currency to the Schengen zone of passport-free travel.
But French and German views no longer represent the main dividing lines in Europe. Germany is changing its views following unification. France and Germany have not put forward a really major initiative for European integration in the last decade. Relations have warmed since the elections in both countries in 2002 because of exceptional circumstances - France rescued a weak German government from its isolation in opposing the war in Iraq, while Germany helped France to maintain its defense of the common agricultural policy. But this is probably a temporary reconciliation.
After enlargement, Franco-German agreement will not even be necessary for an initiative to proceed. Short-term, pragmatic liaisons will replace the emotional, history-laden marriage between Germany and France. The trade-offs will become more complex as member states bargain across different issues. Poland stands with Britain in opposing tax harmonization, for example, but Warsaw will support Madrid against London in demanding a larger EU budget. By contrast, Estonia is strongly against subsidies and will favor reform of EU agricultural policy, along with the Czech Republic and possibly Hungary. But Estonia will have similar interests to the Danes and other small countries in wanting Europe to protect its minority language films and TV.
In economic policy, the new members will make the EU more open. They all liberalized their economies fairly quickly in the 1990s to gain foreign investment and trade. They are keen on structural reform of Europe's more sclerotic economies because three-quarters of their exports depend on faster growth in the markets of the 15 current members. Nevertheless, the new members have a strong preference for maintaining the European model of social welfare - so in this respect they are more like Germany than the U.K.
One divide that will become more important is the one between big and small countries. Already, there is an alliance within the European Convention, which is debating a new constitutional treaty for the EU, between the small countries in opposing the big-country idea of creating a president for the European Council. The smalls are afraid that a president of Europe would listen mostly to the large countries. They are keen to promote the role of the commission, which has traditionally protected the smaller member states by insisting on the equal application of EU laws and treaties to all, regardless of size. On foreign policy, they fear that a directoire of large member-states will dominate, forcing the others to comply thanks to their diplomatic clout and military resources.
The Iraq crisis has shown these fears to be overblown, because the large countries disagree among themselves about many issues. The biggest divisions have been between London, Paris and Berlin, not between large and small. But the small countries are still keen to ensure that the new constitution should preserve equality of representation in foreign policy-making.
Poland's voters need not fear joining an EU dominated by France and Germany. The country will be one of the "Big Six" member states, and it will have full voting rights in all the EU's decision-making bodies. That gives the country a major opportunity to shape the EU's future development. Polish views will be heard loud and clear in the EU - and nobody will be able to tell the new members to shut up, as Jacques Chirac did earlier this year.
But what will Poland's views on critical issues be? Many are still unclear. For example, on the detailed agenda for the "Lisbon process" of economic reform, what kinds of structural reforms will the country favor for the European economy? In other areas, the national position will change over time. For example, Poland could defend the EU's current agricultural subsidies in the short term, arguing strongly for a shorter transitional period until its farmers have the same level of subsidies as their counterparts in the EU-15 countries. But in the longer run, Poland would benefit from the EU's agriculture subsidies being diverted into regional development funds instead of letting half of the EU's budget be spent on an aging farm population.
The nightmare scenario would be a country that is Spanish on the budget (fighting tooth and nail for every euro), French in defending the common agricultural policy, British in its pro-Americanism, Danish in its euroscepticism, and Italian in its chaotic public administration. This Poland would be a very awkward partner in the union. It would also not be a very influential member state, if it were focused on extracting money and incapable of pursuing other interests effectively. This is not - fortunately - the most likely scenario. But to avoid it, Poland will have to work hard over the next year to define its positions and prepare the civil service for the demanding job of EU membership.
