Goldeneyes
He went even further and looked the man in the eye. What did the born-again Christian see in the eyes of a former KGB officer, who once oversaw the most disastrous spying operation ever launched by the Soviet secret service? He saw, "an honest democrat and a true friend," or so the U.S. president himself pronounced.
Sadly, Deputy Prime Minister Marek Pol is less candid about what he has seen in the eyes of various Russian officials he has repeatedly met with during negotiations for a gas supply contract. Still, there can be no doubt that the most ridiculously incompetent minister in the democratic history of this country does have quite a gift for seeing strange things. He sees, for example, all those miles of motorways he has built, even though they seem invisible to everyone else. And how does he manage to see the gas contract he signed last March as his own personal success, not to mention that of Poland in general? The whole country is in no doubt that it was an unmitigated disaster.
Given his track record for pig-headed refusal to look the facts in the face, you might think that he would be unable to surprise the nation any more than he has on so many previous occasions. But his reaction to the Russian decision to stop all gas supplies to Belarus, and in consequence to this country, set a new high of self-delusion (or is it cynicism?). "The country's energy security is not compromised in any way," he said, "We have enough gas to supply households for an entire month." Wow, a whole month, pundits gasped. Admittedly, a number of disgusting hacks, desperate to find an excuse for their vicious, and unfounded, attacks on the government, pointed out that it would have been nice if the corporate sector could also be supplied with gas. But who listens to the cynics, who are most likely in the pay of foreign secret services anyway, as Andrzej Barcikowski, the head of the Internal Security Agency (ABW), last year suggested in a report on the nasty media that criticises the hard-working, talented ministers of the calibre of Marek Pol.
By cutting off Poland in an attempt to blackmail Belarus' grotesque dictator Alexander Lukashenko, Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, created a suitable setting for the Brussels meeting of the 25 EU foreign ministers to discuss relations with Russia. The 'honest democrat,' Vladimir Putin, is refusing to extend the existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which governs Russia's economic and political relationship with the Union, to its eight new members in Central Europe (though the deal will automatically apply to Cyprus, Russia's second-biggest source of foreign direct investment, and Malta). Only once fourteen conditions have been met, says Russia, will the agreement apply to the former Soviet-bloc countries. The Russian stance runs counter to the practice developed over the previous rounds of enlargement, where the PCA's extension was always unconditional. Should the EU bow to Moscow's blackmail, the worst fears of the 'new Europeans' would be confirmed. The suggestion that some members of the Union are more equal than others, coupled with the impression that the national interests of certain member states could still be held hostage to 'old Europe's' relationship with Russia, would surely lead to an outcry. Will this be enough to convince the French or the Germans, whose friendship with Putin is only marginally less cordial than Bush's? It seems likely, though there could still be repercussions.
While Russia is unlikely to get what it wants, the new members of the club could suffer from the dispute all the same. For at least several months after accession, the PCA would not apply to the new countries, while the old guard would still enjoy all the privileges, even if the EU makes good its promise to revoke the agreement. But wouldn't the diplomatic showdown hurt Russia, which, after all, stands to lose its preferential treatment in trade with the EU? Not likely, considering that oil and gas account for more than 90 percent of its exports to the EU. With the current instability in the world's richest oil region and OPEC's determination to keep prices artificially high, Europe can ill afford to cut down on those imports.
Throughout the centuries, the Poles have come to be deeply distrustful of their eastern neighbor. Nor do they have particular reason to feel they can count on their Western European friends and allies to lend support at times of crisis. Should the looming confrontation be averted, they might just change their mind on this last issue. But the EU would do well to tread carefully, if it wants to avoid antagonising, either the 'honest democrat' in the Kremlin, or the small, but feisty, 'new European' lot.
Sadly, Deputy Prime Minister Marek Pol is less candid about what he has seen in the eyes of various Russian officials he has repeatedly met with during negotiations for a gas supply contract. Still, there can be no doubt that the most ridiculously incompetent minister in the democratic history of this country does have quite a gift for seeing strange things. He sees, for example, all those miles of motorways he has built, even though they seem invisible to everyone else. And how does he manage to see the gas contract he signed last March as his own personal success, not to mention that of Poland in general? The whole country is in no doubt that it was an unmitigated disaster.
Given his track record for pig-headed refusal to look the facts in the face, you might think that he would be unable to surprise the nation any more than he has on so many previous occasions. But his reaction to the Russian decision to stop all gas supplies to Belarus, and in consequence to this country, set a new high of self-delusion (or is it cynicism?). "The country's energy security is not compromised in any way," he said, "We have enough gas to supply households for an entire month." Wow, a whole month, pundits gasped. Admittedly, a number of disgusting hacks, desperate to find an excuse for their vicious, and unfounded, attacks on the government, pointed out that it would have been nice if the corporate sector could also be supplied with gas. But who listens to the cynics, who are most likely in the pay of foreign secret services anyway, as Andrzej Barcikowski, the head of the Internal Security Agency (ABW), last year suggested in a report on the nasty media that criticises the hard-working, talented ministers of the calibre of Marek Pol.
By cutting off Poland in an attempt to blackmail Belarus' grotesque dictator Alexander Lukashenko, Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, created a suitable setting for the Brussels meeting of the 25 EU foreign ministers to discuss relations with Russia. The 'honest democrat,' Vladimir Putin, is refusing to extend the existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which governs Russia's economic and political relationship with the Union, to its eight new members in Central Europe (though the deal will automatically apply to Cyprus, Russia's second-biggest source of foreign direct investment, and Malta). Only once fourteen conditions have been met, says Russia, will the agreement apply to the former Soviet-bloc countries. The Russian stance runs counter to the practice developed over the previous rounds of enlargement, where the PCA's extension was always unconditional. Should the EU bow to Moscow's blackmail, the worst fears of the 'new Europeans' would be confirmed. The suggestion that some members of the Union are more equal than others, coupled with the impression that the national interests of certain member states could still be held hostage to 'old Europe's' relationship with Russia, would surely lead to an outcry. Will this be enough to convince the French or the Germans, whose friendship with Putin is only marginally less cordial than Bush's? It seems likely, though there could still be repercussions.
While Russia is unlikely to get what it wants, the new members of the club could suffer from the dispute all the same. For at least several months after accession, the PCA would not apply to the new countries, while the old guard would still enjoy all the privileges, even if the EU makes good its promise to revoke the agreement. But wouldn't the diplomatic showdown hurt Russia, which, after all, stands to lose its preferential treatment in trade with the EU? Not likely, considering that oil and gas account for more than 90 percent of its exports to the EU. With the current instability in the world's richest oil region and OPEC's determination to keep prices artificially high, Europe can ill afford to cut down on those imports.
Throughout the centuries, the Poles have come to be deeply distrustful of their eastern neighbor. Nor do they have particular reason to feel they can count on their Western European friends and allies to lend support at times of crisis. Should the looming confrontation be averted, they might just change their mind on this last issue. But the EU would do well to tread carefully, if it wants to avoid antagonising, either the 'honest democrat' in the Kremlin, or the small, but feisty, 'new European' lot.
