Snapping the French connection
My old master, Hubert Beuve-Méry, the founder of Le Monde, used to tell us: "I don't ask you to be objective. This is a dull notion. I want you to be passionate on the job. But I am asking you much more: to always be honest!" At the present time, it is indeed very hard for a Frenchman to be objective. Let's try then to be honest!
It is difficult not to be overwhelmed by pride when one sees the huge majority of the countries of the world and of public opinion rallying behind France's opposition to war and looking to President Jacques Chirac as the leader of a call for a more humane and decent world. At the same time, the Polish media are usually presenting the debate in such a way that it is impossible for the average citizen to understand what the respective positions are and what is at stake in the long run. Let's try then to be more precise.
The French are not supporting Saddam Hussein in any way. We all agree that he is an awful leader. We want him to disarm and we wish to see Iraq as a democratic country. Chirac has always said that Iraq has to disarm and that, if nothing else works, then we may have to use force to achieve that goal. This, however, should be done as a last resort and with the full backing of the international community, that is to say of the United Nations. On the other hand, argues the French government, any action taken by one superpower when there is still a possibility to achieve the same results by peaceful means, is - as a preemptive strike - immoral and illegitimate (as Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin put it, speaking at the parliament on February 27: "The force of the law and not the law of force must prevail."). Moreover, it will have for decades the gravest consequences in the West's relations with the Arab countries and in world economic stability as well.
Chirac believes that the American goal is mostly economic and strategic: President George W. Bush believes that control over Iraqi oil resources will ensure American hegemony for a long time. What then of the efforts to build the European Union as an alternative superpower promoting in the world a policy based upon humanism and, yes, centuries-old values?
Here we reach the conflict inside the European Union. The debate is: should we always support, for the sake of Atlantic solidarity, what any US administration is doing? Or should Europe try to speak with her own voice, to present to the world her own policy, to promote a humanistic vision of foreign policy? Or, to put it differently, should Europe be a vassal of the US or a partner, loyal but independent? At stake is the future not only of Europe but also of the Atlantic alliance. In other words, should we be pro-European Atlantists or pro-Atlantist Europeans? The battle has been raging for some time inside the present EU. On the one side you have Britain and Spain, on the other France and Germany.
In the middle of this confrontation, the famous (or infamous) "letter of the 8," signed also by Poland and supporting unconditionally Mr. Bush's policy, was seen by Chirac as inadmissible interference by some countries which are not yet members of the union, into a battle raging there. Poland (and others) could have waited to become members to take part in this debate or have expressed their own views, but to take sides with some present members of the EU against others was seen by the French president as highly improper.
Granted, the French reaction was particularly strong after the Polish decision to choose the American F-16 over the (much better) Gripen or Mirage, and for that matter in a deal, as we see it today, that was not even properly sealed with the US. To make matters worse, Poland made this choice just a few weeks after the decision on enlargement and after Prime Minister Leszek Miller had worked so hard to get one more billion euro from the EU. Was it to save the Polish budget or to buy, thanks to the European taxpayers, American equipment?
The result of all this is obviously that Poland is not too popular these days in Paris. It would be foolish not to recognise that the consequences, also in terms of economic relations, will be serious and long-lasting. If someone hopes that they will be easily overcome, he is making a bitter mistake; if anything, because Chirac is a man who never forgets. But, more profoundly, France sees that all the involvement that has made this country the first investor in Poland is not being rewarded in any way. Should then the French state continue to give its backing and grant warranties to French investments in Poland? We see already that when Peugeot Citroen has to decide where to build a huge factory in eastern Europe, it chooses now to do it in Slovakia. A few months back, Poland would have been chosen.
Politically, France wants to build a European Europe and, after this battle, no matter what happens with Iraq, France will do it with a core group of countries, like Germany, Belgium, Austria, and probably after all the Czech Republic (the government in Prague distanced itself from Vaclav Havel after he signed the letter). The admission of Poland (and others) to the EU will be far less significant than it would have been.
Another development is the role played by Vladimir Putin. Thanks to his stand during recent weeks, Russia has made a huge step towards Europe, and even the core EU of tomorrow. For France, not only the French-German alliance, but also the link with Russia will be the priority of the future, both politically and economically. The time will come when the current Polish leaders, and the media which back them, will have to ask themselves if they have not made an error of historical proportion.
It is difficult not to be overwhelmed by pride when one sees the huge majority of the countries of the world and of public opinion rallying behind France's opposition to war and looking to President Jacques Chirac as the leader of a call for a more humane and decent world. At the same time, the Polish media are usually presenting the debate in such a way that it is impossible for the average citizen to understand what the respective positions are and what is at stake in the long run. Let's try then to be more precise.
The French are not supporting Saddam Hussein in any way. We all agree that he is an awful leader. We want him to disarm and we wish to see Iraq as a democratic country. Chirac has always said that Iraq has to disarm and that, if nothing else works, then we may have to use force to achieve that goal. This, however, should be done as a last resort and with the full backing of the international community, that is to say of the United Nations. On the other hand, argues the French government, any action taken by one superpower when there is still a possibility to achieve the same results by peaceful means, is - as a preemptive strike - immoral and illegitimate (as Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin put it, speaking at the parliament on February 27: "The force of the law and not the law of force must prevail."). Moreover, it will have for decades the gravest consequences in the West's relations with the Arab countries and in world economic stability as well.
Chirac believes that the American goal is mostly economic and strategic: President George W. Bush believes that control over Iraqi oil resources will ensure American hegemony for a long time. What then of the efforts to build the European Union as an alternative superpower promoting in the world a policy based upon humanism and, yes, centuries-old values?
Here we reach the conflict inside the European Union. The debate is: should we always support, for the sake of Atlantic solidarity, what any US administration is doing? Or should Europe try to speak with her own voice, to present to the world her own policy, to promote a humanistic vision of foreign policy? Or, to put it differently, should Europe be a vassal of the US or a partner, loyal but independent? At stake is the future not only of Europe but also of the Atlantic alliance. In other words, should we be pro-European Atlantists or pro-Atlantist Europeans? The battle has been raging for some time inside the present EU. On the one side you have Britain and Spain, on the other France and Germany.
In the middle of this confrontation, the famous (or infamous) "letter of the 8," signed also by Poland and supporting unconditionally Mr. Bush's policy, was seen by Chirac as inadmissible interference by some countries which are not yet members of the union, into a battle raging there. Poland (and others) could have waited to become members to take part in this debate or have expressed their own views, but to take sides with some present members of the EU against others was seen by the French president as highly improper.
Granted, the French reaction was particularly strong after the Polish decision to choose the American F-16 over the (much better) Gripen or Mirage, and for that matter in a deal, as we see it today, that was not even properly sealed with the US. To make matters worse, Poland made this choice just a few weeks after the decision on enlargement and after Prime Minister Leszek Miller had worked so hard to get one more billion euro from the EU. Was it to save the Polish budget or to buy, thanks to the European taxpayers, American equipment?
The result of all this is obviously that Poland is not too popular these days in Paris. It would be foolish not to recognise that the consequences, also in terms of economic relations, will be serious and long-lasting. If someone hopes that they will be easily overcome, he is making a bitter mistake; if anything, because Chirac is a man who never forgets. But, more profoundly, France sees that all the involvement that has made this country the first investor in Poland is not being rewarded in any way. Should then the French state continue to give its backing and grant warranties to French investments in Poland? We see already that when Peugeot Citroen has to decide where to build a huge factory in eastern Europe, it chooses now to do it in Slovakia. A few months back, Poland would have been chosen.
Politically, France wants to build a European Europe and, after this battle, no matter what happens with Iraq, France will do it with a core group of countries, like Germany, Belgium, Austria, and probably after all the Czech Republic (the government in Prague distanced itself from Vaclav Havel after he signed the letter). The admission of Poland (and others) to the EU will be far less significant than it would have been.
Another development is the role played by Vladimir Putin. Thanks to his stand during recent weeks, Russia has made a huge step towards Europe, and even the core EU of tomorrow. For France, not only the French-German alliance, but also the link with Russia will be the priority of the future, both politically and economically. The time will come when the current Polish leaders, and the media which back them, will have to ask themselves if they have not made an error of historical proportion.
