The Caucasian conundrum

But for EU leaders, the worst thing that occurred was having to cut short their expensive holidays. The outbreak of the Georgia-Russia conflict ruined a carefree summer for them.

Who to blame?

At this point, even the political analysts have stopped asking which side, Russia or Georgia, is guiltier of starting the August conflict. On the one hand, it is hard to imagine that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili - who is surrounded by American advisors every day and has been acquiring the latest American weaponry over the last few months - would have simply decided to launch a complicated military operation on a whim.

It is equally difficult to imagine, however, that Russia set its military and propaganda machine in motion in order to defend 50,000 South Ossetians who, armed to the teeth with Russian weapons, have been shooting up Georgian border positions for months.

Most of all, however, it is impossible to believe the words of Russian President Medvedev, that "Russia has undertaken actions to forcibly bring about peace." Even the most pro-Kremlin elites in the EU have had trouble swallowing that line.

Russian motivations

Big money and big business can be seen in the background of this war. If Russia should manage to occupy the whole of Georgia with impunity and replace President Saakashvili with a politician subservient to Moscow, then the West could forget about the rich natural resources of the Caucasus for a long time. It is certain that there would be no Nabucco Pipeline to bring gas from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Europe, meaning one less energy alternative to free the EU from its dependence on Russian gas.

A second issue is the matter Russia's long-term political ambitions. The Georgia conflict could be the opening move in a broader gambit to expand Russian influence. In just the same way, it could stoke the situations in Transnistria and in Ukraine, assembling a new empire from the pieces like a child with a jigsaw puzzle.

A tactical error

Russia's strategists made a mistake, however, and underestimated the sharpness of the reaction from America and the European Union. Admittedly, the EU took too long to resolutely react to the war, but in the end its leaders, resigned to the interruption of their sacred holiday time, allowed the Kremlin little leeway.

The offensive in Georgia also did away with the last crumbling vestiges of Russia's image as a nation building a new liberal system, modernizing itself on the principles of respect for law and democracy. Even those EU politicians fond of Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin had to admit that the fears of post-communist states such as Poland should be taken seriously. The once fantastic vision of an aggressive Russia suddenly seemed uncomfortably real.

The fact that US and EU leaders began to speak out with a unified voice against the conflict in the Caucasus proved a failure for Russia's policy of dividing the transatlantic consensus and conquering through bilateral relations with individual member states. Russia was irritated, for example, by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's claim that the EU's ties with Russia would be curtailed if its military did not withdraw from Georgia. Even more humiliating for Russia were calls to remove it from the G8 and to limit contact with NATO.

Limping forward

No political conflict lasts forever, however. The present strife will soon limp towards a resolution because the West needs Russian resources as much as Russia needs Western money. The one thing that can be said for certain about the Georgia conflict is that all participants in the conflict have engaged in a new level of strategic struggle which will last for years.

Joanna Wóycicka is the former head of the foreign sections of the Życie Warszawy and Życie newspapers and the former head of the foreign department at the Polish Press Agency (PAP).