The need for patience

Bringing East European countries closer to EU is a long and gradual process, but the accession of countries like Poland has changed "old Europe's" view of the East European states. At this year's Economic Forum in Krynica, WBJ caught up with Katarzyna Wolczuk, deputy director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, to talk about EU diplomacy and the east-west divide

Konrad Kiedrzyński: What role does the EU play in involving Eastern European states in Western issues? Don't you think that the EU reaction to the Georgian crisis revealed a weakness in Western-Eastern ties?

Katarzyna Wolczuk: It seems to me that what the EU wants to do is apply its transformational power outside its borders, but the EU is very weak as a foreign policy player in terms of interests, consensus and resources.

At the moment there is agreement that the EU should do something, but not about the cost of such an initiative. The EU seems to say, yes, let us talk about normative order but without incurring enlargement costs. This is why the EU neighborhood policy is stuck. [It is] stuck between the desire to project the normative power and lack of will to bear the related costs and expenses. This particularly matters in the case of bigger countries such as Ukraine.

The Georgian crisis has amplified the situation, exacerbating the division within the EU. Determined countries are even more determined [to strengthen EU-Ukrainian ties].

Some countries like Poland, and interestingly the UK, are talking about Ukraine being brought closer to Europe, but other EU members, for example Germany, are even more cautious than before.

How would you evaluate the role of eastern EU countries in bringing Ukraine "closer to Europe?"

The whole issue of the eastern dimension is definitely changing within the EU, thanks to new EU members. [French and German politicians] say that Ukraine is now treated differently because it is constantly brought up as a subject of discussion. We cannot expect a radical geopolitical reorientation of the EU towards Ukraine, however. The process is very slow and gradual, and we do not expect any spectacular changes.

How do you see Poland's role in the process?

This should be sorted out within the EU. What the EU cannot say, Poland should, albeit in a very diplomatic way. The [diplomatic] messages sent [by Poland] to the EU neighboring countries are very important. But even more important [for Poland's eastern policy] is to act within the EU platform.

Right now, Poland is in a very difficult situation because, on the one hand, there is an expectation that our eastern policy will be sorted out by Poland, but when Poland wants [to take the initiative] it is accused of doing too much and not understanding the reality within the EU.

Yet, leading this policy within the EU is the only way to go. Obviously Poland has multi-lateral interests [within Europe] and this so-called Eastern direction is only one of them.

But isn't there a risk that all of the EU may act too slowly and lack efficiency in the process? Shouldn't Poland act more independently here?

Bilateral relations with Ukraine are one of Poland's biggest advantages since [the latter] is now in the EU. For Ukraine, individual member states do not mean too much. It is very important in Ukraine that Poland is in the EU.

How feasible is it to do the same with Belarus?

The way to deal with Belarus is organization of numerous contacts engaging multiple sectors, as well as showing clear benefits of the EU closer cooperation. Still the process [of bringing Belarus closer to Europe] will be a long one and a lot of patience is needed.