Trouble with the neighbours
Przyszłość i przeszłość. To German ears, the Polish words for "future" and "past" are hardly distinguishable. The common past of World War II has determined sensitive bilateral relations between the neighbouring states for the last decades, and will continue to influence them - hopefully to a lesser extent - in the future.
In 1945, Poland won huge parts of its territory and economic resources from a defeated and divided Germany. Nearly six decades later, the two nations seem to have come to totally different historical conclusions from their wartime and post-war traumas. The now pacifist Germans have learned that war can never be a substitute for politics. Good partnerships have proved to be the best guarantee for the peaceful development of the continent. While Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his red-green crew have lost much popularity due to their poor economic track record, their Iraq policy is undoubtedly backed by the overwhelming majority of Germans.
The historical arguments the Polish government has brought to the diplomatic battlefield to explain its unconditional backing of the Pentagon crusaders' invasion plans of Iraq are quite different. They believe that dictators should be fought as early as possible and that loyalty to the US is the best security shield.
Poland's policy on Iraq is not backed by the majority of its people, but it's every government's duty and right to formulate its own diplomatic priorities. It's less the fact that Warsaw has chosen a different standing on the Iraq issue, than the lack of communication and undiplomatic manner which have provoked Germany's irritation, disillusionment and even a certain bitterness.
Before the Copenhagen Summit last December, the Polish government searched for close contacts with German colleagues. As self-declared friends, Leszek Miller and Schröder seemed to be an inseparable couple for weeks. But as soon as the EU negotiations concluded (with a little help from German and French friends), Poland somehow seemed to have forgotten about its future European partners. The purchase of F-16 aircraft from the Americans and the promise of big offsets occupied Miller's government after Copenhagen.
Fair enough, one could say, but then the Germans saw Miller's signature on the "letter of the eight," which supported the Bush administration's stance on an armed invasion of Iraq, as an unwelcome surprise. With self-chosen loyalties and economic dependencies, there is no explanation why Miller did not give Schröder at least short notice about his intention. Had he called him the night before to tell him that he felt obliged to sign the letter, the German chancellor would have been displeased, yet at least a certain level of an honest partnership would have been maintained. Instead, Poland took part in a kind of secret diplomatic action, set up by those European nations - acting on American orders - which never cared too much about EU enlargement, or had even opposed it, as did Spain. The unprofessional and disloyal way the Polish government dealt with the matter made German diplomats in Warsaw feel they had been fooled.
With his rough, but well-planned slip of the tongue, French President Jacques Chirac expressed to a certain level feelings shared in Berlin, though no German politician would ever dare to deal with the eastern neighbours in such an arrogant and paternalistic way. Meanwhile, the German press unanimously judged Chirac's affront on the candidate states as unnecessary, impolite and destructive. Germany also shared fears that such language might assist eurosceptics in the candidate countries in their efforts to gain support in the upcoming EU membership referendums.
In the long term, the turbulence over Iraq will be just one episode in our bilateral relations, but fortunately not a landmark. We both have to deal with the much bigger problems of the past - and somehow have to overcome them. But Poland should be more concerned about the consequences of its position on Iraq for its future EU membership.
Unlike France, Germany's political support for EU enlargement has remained generally the same even after the disagreement over war in Iraq, although people have never really been enthusiastic about it. Germany has always been considered the lawyer for Poland's accession - and it still is. And while Germany will have to pay the most for the eastern enlargement, it will also gain the most profit from it. It's no surprise then that after the first row, foreign minister Joschka Fischer assured Danuta Hübner at the end of February in Brussels that he understood her government's attitude towards the US, having "come through the 50-year-long Soviet occupation and see(ing) the US in a different light."
Strong Polish support for the US should have hardly any consequences for bilateral trade relations with Germany. German investors here are more concerned about the country's poor infrastructure, bureaucracy and gloomy economic prospects than about the question of whether or not Warsaw sends a couple of its elite troops to support the American-British armada in another Gulf War.
But, of course, the Iraq issue will have an impact on the relations between Germany as an old EU member and Poland as a newcomer. The dreams of a Polish extension of the French-German axis in the EU have definitely turned out to be an illusion.
The "letter of the eight" has also strengthened the position of those countries pleading for a "Europe of two speeds" - a core union centred around France, Germany and the Benelux countries, which are willing to continue the integration process; and the rest of the union, which shares the benefits of the common market, but not much more.
Berlin's disillusionment with its Polish partner has also raised the questions of what the country really plans to do with its union membership and what kind of strategic co-operation it would likely have with Germany in the enlarged EU. If Poland is just running and fighting for money pots, Berlin will soon lose any interest in a deeper partnership.
Warsaw often talks very vaguely about bringing a new eastern dimension to the union. But Germany and France already have much better contacts with Moscow than does Poland. And considering the democratic deficits of Ukraine and Belarus, Polish plans to offer these eastern neighbours a European perspective seem to be a rather senseless effort.
Poland likes to stress the fact that its transatlantic orientation is as important as its integration into the EU. But as the stir about Chirac's declarations has shown, foreign policy here is often explained in the context of the country's history or seems at least to be determined by historical instincts, and will continue to be so with the kind of loyalty conflicts the country will face after joining the EU. In tilting between the US and its future EU partners, the country still hasn't found a credible balance.
Przeszłość will always influence przyszłość, but knowledge about the past should never be a burden for the future.
In 1945, Poland won huge parts of its territory and economic resources from a defeated and divided Germany. Nearly six decades later, the two nations seem to have come to totally different historical conclusions from their wartime and post-war traumas. The now pacifist Germans have learned that war can never be a substitute for politics. Good partnerships have proved to be the best guarantee for the peaceful development of the continent. While Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his red-green crew have lost much popularity due to their poor economic track record, their Iraq policy is undoubtedly backed by the overwhelming majority of Germans.
The historical arguments the Polish government has brought to the diplomatic battlefield to explain its unconditional backing of the Pentagon crusaders' invasion plans of Iraq are quite different. They believe that dictators should be fought as early as possible and that loyalty to the US is the best security shield.
Poland's policy on Iraq is not backed by the majority of its people, but it's every government's duty and right to formulate its own diplomatic priorities. It's less the fact that Warsaw has chosen a different standing on the Iraq issue, than the lack of communication and undiplomatic manner which have provoked Germany's irritation, disillusionment and even a certain bitterness.
Before the Copenhagen Summit last December, the Polish government searched for close contacts with German colleagues. As self-declared friends, Leszek Miller and Schröder seemed to be an inseparable couple for weeks. But as soon as the EU negotiations concluded (with a little help from German and French friends), Poland somehow seemed to have forgotten about its future European partners. The purchase of F-16 aircraft from the Americans and the promise of big offsets occupied Miller's government after Copenhagen.
Fair enough, one could say, but then the Germans saw Miller's signature on the "letter of the eight," which supported the Bush administration's stance on an armed invasion of Iraq, as an unwelcome surprise. With self-chosen loyalties and economic dependencies, there is no explanation why Miller did not give Schröder at least short notice about his intention. Had he called him the night before to tell him that he felt obliged to sign the letter, the German chancellor would have been displeased, yet at least a certain level of an honest partnership would have been maintained. Instead, Poland took part in a kind of secret diplomatic action, set up by those European nations - acting on American orders - which never cared too much about EU enlargement, or had even opposed it, as did Spain. The unprofessional and disloyal way the Polish government dealt with the matter made German diplomats in Warsaw feel they had been fooled.
With his rough, but well-planned slip of the tongue, French President Jacques Chirac expressed to a certain level feelings shared in Berlin, though no German politician would ever dare to deal with the eastern neighbours in such an arrogant and paternalistic way. Meanwhile, the German press unanimously judged Chirac's affront on the candidate states as unnecessary, impolite and destructive. Germany also shared fears that such language might assist eurosceptics in the candidate countries in their efforts to gain support in the upcoming EU membership referendums.
In the long term, the turbulence over Iraq will be just one episode in our bilateral relations, but fortunately not a landmark. We both have to deal with the much bigger problems of the past - and somehow have to overcome them. But Poland should be more concerned about the consequences of its position on Iraq for its future EU membership.
Unlike France, Germany's political support for EU enlargement has remained generally the same even after the disagreement over war in Iraq, although people have never really been enthusiastic about it. Germany has always been considered the lawyer for Poland's accession - and it still is. And while Germany will have to pay the most for the eastern enlargement, it will also gain the most profit from it. It's no surprise then that after the first row, foreign minister Joschka Fischer assured Danuta Hübner at the end of February in Brussels that he understood her government's attitude towards the US, having "come through the 50-year-long Soviet occupation and see(ing) the US in a different light."
Strong Polish support for the US should have hardly any consequences for bilateral trade relations with Germany. German investors here are more concerned about the country's poor infrastructure, bureaucracy and gloomy economic prospects than about the question of whether or not Warsaw sends a couple of its elite troops to support the American-British armada in another Gulf War.
But, of course, the Iraq issue will have an impact on the relations between Germany as an old EU member and Poland as a newcomer. The dreams of a Polish extension of the French-German axis in the EU have definitely turned out to be an illusion.
The "letter of the eight" has also strengthened the position of those countries pleading for a "Europe of two speeds" - a core union centred around France, Germany and the Benelux countries, which are willing to continue the integration process; and the rest of the union, which shares the benefits of the common market, but not much more.
Berlin's disillusionment with its Polish partner has also raised the questions of what the country really plans to do with its union membership and what kind of strategic co-operation it would likely have with Germany in the enlarged EU. If Poland is just running and fighting for money pots, Berlin will soon lose any interest in a deeper partnership.
Warsaw often talks very vaguely about bringing a new eastern dimension to the union. But Germany and France already have much better contacts with Moscow than does Poland. And considering the democratic deficits of Ukraine and Belarus, Polish plans to offer these eastern neighbours a European perspective seem to be a rather senseless effort.
Poland likes to stress the fact that its transatlantic orientation is as important as its integration into the EU. But as the stir about Chirac's declarations has shown, foreign policy here is often explained in the context of the country's history or seems at least to be determined by historical instincts, and will continue to be so with the kind of loyalty conflicts the country will face after joining the EU. In tilting between the US and its future EU partners, the country still hasn't found a credible balance.
Przeszłość will always influence przyszłość, but knowledge about the past should never be a burden for the future.
