Will we face a rude awakening in the EU?
Marcin Nowicki is an economist at the Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics.
Poland is a unique country in the European Union kindergarten. This is due to our deeply routed messiah attitude (at the very least in our national literature) and self-esteem, which unfortunately exceeds Poland's economic and political position in the global system by far.
This uniqueness is, in fact, reasonably justified - in terms of the number of inhabitants and the geographic size of the country. The largeness by itself wouldn't be a problem if the country's regional landscape weren't so diversified. Therefore, we must look at EU accession consequences in a much more complex way than other candidate countries may.
While other candidates can concentrate mainly on the macroeconomic level, we have to take our analyses much deeper - at least into the regional level. It makes the whole assessment more complicated. The government's approach to measure the costs of the country's accession to the EU has been, euphemistically speaking, narrow. Its analyses have concentrated on the costs of adjusting and implementing new laws with little effort to embrace real business costs, not to mention the spatial dimension of those costs. It's high time we had a straight talk about our future in the club to avoid a rude awakening when a first ex-post evaluation comes.
As a Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics study on the regional consequences of the EU accession shows, all regions will benefit from EU membership. This positive additional impact of integration on regional GDP is quite similar among regions: from 1.7% in Łódzkie to 2.4% in Podlaskie. But problems arise when we look at the summarized projections; that is, when we add non-EU-related factors. Then the picture is far less rosy. The predicted average yearly regional growth in the years 2004-2012 varies from 0.7 % in Kujawsko-Pomorskie to 9.4 % in Małopolskie.
Inclusion in the EU - apart from the precision of these projections - is crucial for Poland's future economic and social policy. Regional disparities here are huge and they come strictly from the internal structural situation of the regions. The country's accession to the EU will not diminish these differences in the short run since its impact will be quite similar among regions. What is even more important, we have to be ready for an increase in these disparities if we want the country to develop fast.
Otherwise, if our regional policy is dedicated to lowering these differences at any price, the catching-up process on the national level will be much slower. One can draw a very good comparison: a class at school. If the teacher adjusts his or her demands to the level of the worst pupils, not to the best ones, the performance of the whole class lowers. Probably it's better to be very demanding of all the pupils, at the same time giving special coaching for the weakest ones. Thus, the best solution for the country's regions (and agglomerations) would be to create good conditions for the fast development of the strongest ones with wise support for the most backward ones.
But this kind of an approach requires at least two things. First, the political will and courage to make citizens aware of this, which for many politicians equals political suicide. Second, a prudent catching-up policy for the regions lagging behind is needed. We should be able to define the developmental priorities for each particular region, avoiding the "standard" approach, based on heavy infrastructure investments. Current discussion on the absorption of the EU's aid concentrates on the quantity aspects.
Putting it in a nutshell, we are all hot and bothered about how to use as many euros from the structural funds as possible, whereas the more important dilemmas are ignored. Do we refine the schedule of needed investments or their most wanted directions? Do we know what is better from the long-term development perspective of each region: building the motorway, investing in education or maybe support for the small businesses? For some regions, the transport infrastructure is a number-one priority; for others - without prior support for their internal economic potential - it could be a real threat.
But to be able to define regional policy, a profound economic and social awareness is essential. Meanwhile, what we are ready to do is only a passive adjustment to the EU requirements. Up to now, we've been copying standard solutions even though they usually are inadequate for our conditions. The EU integration success stories (Ireland, Spain and Portugal) show that countries with smart (not to say cunning) and clearly defined internal policies are able to make full use of the opportunities that EU accession offers. Actually, the EU leaves its members to their own devices as far as the development pattern is concerned. The sooner we realize that, the better our chances for effective convergence with EU standards.
Without doing our homework well, our efforts to cut Brussels' red tape would be a mug's game. Our pre-referendum debate has been very pathetic and stereotype-oriented by both sides. Instead of preparing ourselves to make a good business on integration, what we have heard are only empty words about our historical right to be Europeans. To make it clear: European integration is much more than only new business opportunities, but it is also much more than only political correctness.
