A Bush in the hand
It was not only U.S. observers who over the past month were trying to work out who the next president of the United States was going to be. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court finally buried Al Gore, senior Polish policymakers were equally anxious to know the identity of the next leader of the free world. The reason? Because for the current government, the way the election has gone will have significant implications for domestic and foreign policy over the next four years.
In general terms, there has always been a love affair between Poles and the United States. Not only because of the size of the Polish diaspora in the U.S., but also because during communist rule, Poles saw the nation as a symbol of freedom. Support for the U.S. was cemented during Ronald Reagan's presidency, when Regan was viciously attacked by the propaganda machine of martial law-era Poland.
In practical terms, too, many underground Solidarity union activists remember the great material and moral support offered to them by the American AFL-CIO union under the leadership of Lane Kirkland. Radio Free Europe, based in Munich in Germany but financed by U.S. money, was the most listened to foreign station under communism. But again and again, it was the image of the U.S. as the land of liberty and freedom that led many Poles to see the the country as their main strategic ally.
Over the last 10 years, and especially under the current center-right government, many Europeans have labeled Poland "the American Trojan horse" in Europe. That is an exaggeration, as anyone observing Poland's fight for European Union (EU) membership can attest. But many Polish policymakers remember full well that NATO's inclusion of Poland would probably never have happened without the support of the U.S. Polish interests have moved on since then, but that is not to say there are no areas of policy where the current government will not be looking to George W. Bush for a clear lead.
The broadest area is that of defense and security cooperation, with the Poles anxious to move forward in favor of further NATO expansion to include countries such as Slovakia and Lithuania. Many Poles will be pleased to see that among Bush's policy advisers are proponents of rapid NATO expansion. Apart from this is the issue of major defense procurements. NATO has criticized Poland over the last year for doing too little, too late to modernize its armed forces, and Poland's failure to meet its short-term commitments to NATO in this respect is providing ammunition to those in Europe and the U.S. who want to slow NATO expansion down. So if Poles want to improve their fighting ability, they will have to do so cheaply and quickly, and in many categories of equipment, the U.S. can help. Few doubt that the intention to usher in an American product is behind Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek's announcement last week that the government will choose a new airforce fighter by June 2001.
But there are other geopolitical issues where Poland will be looking to the U.S. for guidance. One debate that will soon emerge with increasing clarity is over the future of NATO and its relationship with the putative European Security and Defense Identity project currently emerging from within the EU. The specific decision to move forward with what is effectively an EU army has already brought a blistering attack from current U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen. With Dick Cheney as vice president, there is little doubt that the U.S. will be looking to the Poles to weigh in as critics of the idea. In turn, many Poles are receptive. They dislike the idea of security being moved into the hands of an organization of which they are not a member, and some of whose leaders have already declared that they see Russia, and not the U.S., as the EU's main security partner. On the other hand, some Polish policymakers are concerned about signals from the Bush camp about a more cautious approach toward U.S. engagement in overseas missions such as Kosovo.
Current governing politicians drew a sigh of relief that Bush had made it for another reason: party politics. The Polish right has well-developed links to the Republican Party, and in the face of what seems an imminent political defeat in next year's parliamentary elections, the prospect of only one NATO country with a conservative government Spain was not a happy one. Conversely, for the current opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a Bush administration need not be a comfortable one. SLD leader Leszek Miller, although flirtatious with the U.S., has long signaled his desire to switch Polish foreign policy into a more pro-EU and pro-Russia mode. It will be interesting to see how such a shift if it happens will be welcomed in the new Washington D.C. of George W. Bush.
Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl.
