A lesson in responsibility
Last week saw the government celebrate the second anniversary of Poland's symbolic final return into the Western family of nations: her accession to NATO, together with Hungary and Czech Republic. Although only two years have passed, in that time Poland has learned much about what that membership means not only taking joint responsibility for the health of the alliance today, but also playing its part in the debate about the shape of the alliance tomorrow.
In general terms, few now question the fact that bringing in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was the right thing to have done, and the move has failed to provoke the dire consequences in internal Russian politics that were predicted at the time. Membership has acted as a massive spur to the much-needed reform of Poland's armed forces, a task that had defeated all the predecessors to the current defense minister, Bronislaw Komorowski. Bizarrely, for one of the most centralized and disciplined organizations in Poland, the armed forces have proven to be the organization most immune to change. It was only in the last couple of weeks that the government finally accepted the much-expected 2001-2006 army modernization plan, which forces wholesale restructuring of the military and represents a heroic attempt to shift resources within the limited defense budget away from military bureaucracy and into training and equipment. The plan also moves to a modern financing system, giving the military a guaranteed rolling six-year budget that will finally provide the resources for much-needed weapon procurement.
The issue of internal military reform and arms spending had been causing increasing anxiety in Washington and NATO headquarters, culminating in an embarrassing rap over the knuckles from NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson last year. But now, as Poland and the other new members have slowly started to put their own houses in order, attention is slowly turning to the new challenges that NATO is facing: And just as Poland could not escape its responsibilities in internal reform, neither will it be able to avoid participating in the debate over these new problems.
There are basically three major issues where Poland's voice will be crucial. The first is the potential threat to NATO's coherence from the development of a separate European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Despite protests to the contrary, French politicians in particular admit in private that the strategic goal is to endow the European Union (EU) with its own armed forces separate from NATO and to loosen the grip of the United States over European security. The new administration in Washington, again privately, recognizes that this is a threat and is hoping that Poland, together with the other new members, will play their part in dampening the ardor of the EU to limit U.S. influence in Europe. The current Polish government has indeed met the European defense idea with polite interest but no real enthusiasm. That, however, may change with the next government, likely to be led by the current opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which has already made clear that its political sympathies lie with the EU and the current swathe of social-democrat dominated European governments.
The second issue where Poland will be tested is the prospect of future NATO expansion. Already an ambitious plan among Washington insiders sees the 2002 NATO summit extending an invitation to the Baltic states, as well as at least Slovakia and Slovenia, with the target date being 2005. Again, expect to see this move to be heavily resisted by an increasingly resurgent and determined Vladimir Putin-led Russia, which will use all the instruments at its disposal to derail the expansion. Whether that pressure will be successful or not will depend much on the behavior of the current new members, and it will be an interesting test of the SLD and its leader, Leszek Miller, as to what their voice will be. Miller and the SLD leadership are being assiduously courted by the Americans, but Miller has also made it clear that an improvement in Polish-Russian relations will be a priority of the next SLD government. It is easy enough for Miller to play to two galleries at once now, but the practicalities of government will force him to show his hand.
The third issue, too complex to discuss here, is that of the relationship between the U.S. and the rest of NATO in the context of the Nuclear Missile Defense (NMD) shield that the U.S. is determined to establish to protect itself from the attacks of rogue states and nuclear terrorists. Many Polish analysis are worried that NMD will increase isolationist pressures in the U.S., especially if at the same time the Europeans are busy erecting their own Fortress Europe under the guise of ESDI. Poles are, however, instinctively sympathetic to the need for the U.S. to defend its citizens in this way, and for that very reason will want the U.S. to affirm, not reduce, its European commitment as the price for acceding to U.S. NMD plans.
The greatest benefit that NATO membership has brought with it for the Poles is that it has taught them the meaning of responsibility. Thus far, the Poles have acquitted themselves moderately well in facing up to their responsibilities in terms of internal military reform. After two years of membership, the question is now whether Poland will face up to its crucial role in shaping the future of the alliance upon which its security depends.
Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl
