Changing of the guard
Although it is usually difficult to predict political events in Poland for more than a week in advance, sometimes there are exceptions. One of them will take place on a December weekend during the 2000 Congress of the Freedom Union (UW) party, until recently the junior member of the government before they left the coalition in late spring. The reason why it will be important? Because chances are that it will see the demise of the party's current leader and former Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, and his replacement as party leader by former Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek.
The removal of Balcerowicz as party leader and with that, his probable disappearance from the Polish political scene has been a long time in coming. Recall that his appointment as leader in 1995 was itself hugely controversial, coming at the nadir of the UW's political fortunes in the mid-term of the previous government. At that time, the UW was under the moribund leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland's first non-communist prime minister in 1989, a respected intellectual but possessed of a hugely soporific political non-personality. The party needed new dynamic leadership, and Balcerowicz, with a reputation as a technocratic modernizer, seemed just the ticket. But he also represented a rejection of what many party members saw as woolly social democratic and "intellectual" values, to which Mazowiecki remained strongly attached. That division, between the modernizers and the party old guard, has festered within the UW until this very day.
As long as Balcerowicz was able to deliver political success, the voices of his critics remained stifled. Recent events, however, have led to a maturing of a critical mass of opposition to Balcerowicz, probably sufficient to overthrow him in a few months' time.
Balcerowicz's problem was that he started off with a significant amount of opponents to his leadership in the party, did little to reduce it, and indeed provoked its increase. Part of the problem lies in Balcerowicz's own personality, which brooks no dissent. Meetings of the party board were notorious for a lack of debate and his tendency to ram through decisions on a "back me or sack me" basis. Further frustration was caused by what was seen by party stalwarts as Balcerowicz's tendency to subordinate all party policy to the interests of the Finance Ministry. That was bad news for the "social" faction, which was interested in higher spending on health and education. Finally, Balcerowicz angered many older party members by insisting that talk of cultural or moral values in politics was meaningless, and that the only reality is that which is empirical and quantifiable. Since the UW contains a surfeit of philosophers and poets, that view did not go down well.
But the real nail in Balcerowicz's coffin has been the fate of the party in recent months, following its withdrawal from the Buzek government. To be fair to Balcerowicz, both the move to leave the government, as well as the bizarre decision not to put forward a candidate for the presidential elections, was one which was supported by a majority of the party leadership. But following those decisions, Balcerowicz went out of his way to identify himself with them, and is now paying the price as the party's standing in opinion polls continues to labor in the doldrums.
The culmination of long-term frustration with Balcerowicz's leadership, combined with short-term political difficulties, has resulted in the coalescing of party frustration and a consensus that Balcerowicz must go. For a long time, Balcerowicz was helped by the lack of an obvious successor, but recently this has changed: Geremek, currently head of the newly-created European Law Committee, has discreetly agreed to be the man to take over, providing enough support is generated for his candidacy within the party. There is now an active team in place working to ensure his victory at the December congress.
What are the implications of a Geremek-led UW? Firstly, it would mark a watering down of the party's obsession with the economy in favor of a more socially oriented image, moving the party certainly back to the center. Second, and more intriguingly, it may mean a new lease of life for the Buzek government. Until now, Balcerowicz has been the main driving force in the UW pushing for a rejection of next year's budget, which would open the door for President Aleksander Kwasniewski to dissolve Parliament and order early elections. But if the UW continues to be politically weak, Geremek might be interested in an extra nine months without elections until autumn 2001, in order to restore party fortunes under a new leader and new image. That would mean voting through the budget, and keeping the Buzek team in place until Parliament runs out its full term. A surprise scenario? That's what Polish politics are all about.
