In for the long haul

As with all Polish governments until now, it has not taken long for the first cracks to appear. The dismissals of Culture Minister Andrzej Celiński and Justice Minister Barbara Piwnik, on top of the resignation of Finance Minister Marek Belka, came as a complete surprise to most observers and immediately gave rise to speculation over the future of Prime Minister Leszek Miller's cabinet. On top of the shake up, most observers see the prospect of increasing economic difficulties as well as the presumed rivalry between the office of the prime minister and that of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In many quarters, the conventional wisdom is that Miller is on the ropes already and that his government is heading for an ignominious end at the hands of Kwaśniewski, anxious to install a more pliable prime minister at the helm of the current administration. Polish politics would certainly be even more exciting than it is now were that to be entirely and simply true. But the current government - because of the intricacies of the Polish Constitution and the nature of the relationship between the head of the government and the president - is perhaps one of the most stable of all governments since 1989. Effecting a change against the wishes of Miller himself is a near impossible task. For all the bluster of the opposition, Miller seems to be here to stay, despite what his enemies might wish to see.

It's in the constitution That was not always the case. Poland has rightly gained a reputation for being one of the most politically unstable countries in the former Eastern bloc, but that was as a result of two circumstances that do not hold today. The first was a constitution that was remarkably unsuited to stable governance, and the other factor was that of a president at permanent loggerheads with the government of the day. After 1989, almost all politicians recognized the need for a new constitution to reflect the requirements of democracy, and frankly it was intolerable for Poland to be governed by the Stalinist Constitution of 1952 for a single day more than necessary. However, the fragmented nature of the post-1989 parliaments made it extremely difficult for a consensus to be reached about a new constitution, and the most that was done was a far-reaching amendment in 1991, removing some of the more ridiculous absurdities of the 1952 Constitution. Yet, that did not go hand in hand with the introduction of mechanisms to entrench political stability, and tackle the fundamental flaw of the ability of the Parliament to remove a prime minister by dint of a simple vote of no confidence, and the consequent right of the president to call an election and change the entire Parliament. Between 1991 and 1997, the combination of a fragmented Parliament and a maverick president in the shape of Lech Wałźsa ensured that Polish politics enjoyed the dubious privilege of five prime ministers, as many governments, and an endless merry-go-round of ministers replaced at the drop of a hat. During this period, however, there was enough of a consensus to generate a new constitution that at first sight seemed to resolve this fundamental flaw: The new Constitution of 1997, accepted in a referendum, essentially transferred the key to political stability to the prime minister of the day through making him almost irremovable and by placing exclusive power to nominate and dismiss ministers in his hands. That meant that once a prime minister was appointed, the ability of either Parliament or the president to remove him or force ministerial changes dropped effectively to zero. In the case of Miller's government, the power of Kwaśniewski was at its height at the moment of the formation of the government since the very appointment by the president of Miller as prime minister was contingent on the president accepting Miller's candidates for ministerial office, and enabled the president to impose Marek Belka as finance minister as the price for agreeing that Miller become prime minister. But that power has passed, and under the Constitution, the president has to accept appointments and dismissals of ministers that Miller presents to him. Secondly, the government of Miller can only be removed by a constructive vote of no confidence: In other words, the motion of no confidence must also contain the name of the next prime minister. That is almost impossible to achieve in the current Parliament, as it would require a consensus between the governing party and the current opposition. As Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek's government showed in 1997-2001, even a minority government can survive unscathed for a very long time because of this rule. Ultimately, Miller can only be removed if were he to resign, as a result of the equivalent of the men in gray suits paying him a call. In a party as disciplined as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), that would only be possible as a result of an unprecedented inner-party putsch.

Here to stay There are many scenarios that the coming months may present. A growing rift between the president and prime minister. Perhaps the coalition partner, the Peasants Party (PSL), leaving the government and turning Miller into a minority prime minister. A defeat of the SLD in the autumn local elections. A collapse of the złoty. Failed negotiations with the European Union on entry in 2004. Yet even if all these calamities were to occur, none of them would allow Miller and his government to be removed unless they themselves agreed to it. Indeed, so rigid is the Constitution in this regard that many now see that while it may have been an excellent rule book in times of prosperity and calm, in times of crisis it may prove to be too inflexible, preventing Parliament, the people, or the head of state from effecting the political changes that might be necessary to restore stability and confidence. As ever, Poles are learning the hard way that successful democracy building - and constitution writing - are matters that require not only the application of theory, but also the lessons of practice. Let us hope that the lesson of the upcoming months will not be too painful.

Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl.