Inside the mind of North Korea - and a warning to America
I don't know of many other people who can say they survived a "semi-war." I did, during the North Korean winter of 1991. Night after night the air-raid sirens sounded and I dutifully sealed the black-out curtains to the window frame with black tape so that not the tiniest glimmer of light should escape to guide the US bombers to a target. Meanwhile, the workers at the ceramics factory next door were making their way silently along the darkened street to the safety of the nearby metro station that served as an air-raid shelter.
Of course, the US bombers never came, and I am here now to tell tales of perhaps the strangest fortnight of my seven years in North Korea, when the daytime was punctuated by anti-US rallies and meetings to denounce imperialism, and the night was spent dodging unlit vehicles and temporary military checkpoints. My lasting impression, however, is of a brief sense of camaraderie, enjoyed in a country where foreigners are kept at arm's length; even the bombers, it seemed, were supposed to know about our special foreigners' compound since there was apparently never the need for us to take refuge in the metro. Pointing this out to colleagues proved to be a misplaced attempt at levity since for the people of North Korea the threat of attack is never a matter to joke about, not then and, I am sure, not now.
I say this because once again, it seems, the country is on a war footing. The army has been put on alert, there has been a mass mobilisation of reservists and, no doubt, mass rallies and meetings are being held to denounce the "US imperialists and their lackeys." And that's not where the similarities end between the situation then and now. There is a depressing familiarity to the reasons for the current tension. Back in 1991, the newly-installed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army, Kim Jong Il, declared the state of semi-war in response to the US's resumption of its annual Team Spirit "war games" in South Korea (which had been suspended the previous year as a goodwill gesture). The US had taken this provocative step because of its concerns over North Korea's nuclear programme.
That the US forces in the South hold these exercises, and indeed the very fact that there are any US servicemen there at all, is a lingering insult to North Korean pride. "The greatest desire of all the Korean nation," so a constant refrain of North Korean propaganda goes, "is the reunification of the peninsula." It's a dream that is clearly unattainable, so the logic would have it, as long as the US maintains forces in the South ready to embark on another war. And there, in a nutshell, you have the cause of North Korean antipathy. The US is accused of the remarkable double perfidy back in 1950 of starting the Korean War and then halting the North Korean onslaught that would have reunified the peninsula. As if that wasn't bad enough, they are now perpetuating the division while awaiting the moment to repeat the invasion of half a century ago.
These are the facts as taught to North Koreans from a very young age. It is instilled in them constantly that their country has only ever been the victim of powerful enemies: the Japanese in the first half of the 20th century (whose harsh treatment of the Korean people justifies considerable complaint) and then the Americans. It may be a tall order for foreigners to accept the fact that the US started the Korean War (or rather, the Glorious Fatherland Liberation War), but once this leap of faith has been taken, then it becomes much easier to see the US peace-keeping forces in South Korea for what they are; an army of occupation holding regular war games aimed at another invasion of the North.
As they grow older the schoolchildren will learn more of US arrogance and duplicity. Every day the newspapers carry reports of the latest violations of North Korean airspace by the US air force, and editorials condemn statements by US officials perceived as anti-North Korea. A large part of North Korea's prolific film output is devoted to tales of heroism during the Korean War. (I can speak with some authority on this, having played the role of an aide to General MacArthur in one movie).
The country's economic plight can be blamed on the Americans - the need for constant vigilance against attack is the reason for spending almost a quarter of GDP on defence. It doesn't take much imagination to realise that the Americans are responsible also for the food shortages that have afflicted the country, since the US was a party to the decision to divide the Korean peninsula in 1945, which bequeathed the bulk of the fertile land to the people south of the 38th parallel, while their fellow countrymen in the north were left to scratch out a living from land that is 80% covered by mountains.
It's a propaganda onslaught that has proved highly effective among the population at large. Of the handful of Americans who made it into the country during my time there (the authorities rarely permitted visits by US citizens), one had learned very quickly to tell people he was Canadian; another, by not denying his nationality, risked being refused service in restaurants and was regularly subjected to vitriolic attacks by people, even strangers, who were outraged by his government's crimes against Korea.
So what relevance does all this have to the situation now, when yet again North Korea and the US are at daggers drawn over Pyongyang's nuclear intentions? First, those who advocate military attack on the North would do well to consider that every North Korean receives regular military training, and armed with the mighty ideological weapon of fighting for a just cause, they will prove a formidable enemy. The anti-Americanism that binds these people together is merely strengthened when their country is branded as part of the "Axis of Evil" and threatened with attack. There's no possibility here of towns and villages turning out to welcome the GIs as liberators.
But there won't be a war. It's inconceivable that China, still mistrustful of the US and its military, would want anything of the sort on its border, and South Korea and Japan may also be wary of military conflict involving a cornered neighbour armed with sophisticated missiles that bring their territory well within range. So a compromise will be found - again - and the North will probably gain a few concessions. But then again, how many times can they play the same card hand? The problem is that a dangerous army and nuclear brinkmanship are their only trump cards, and when the attention of the international community wanders the leadership in Pyongyang has no other recourse for easing the plight of a cold and hungry population.
I learned long ago not to forecast how the North Korean government would react in certain situations or to interpret why they were doing what they did, their actions often being unfathomable to outsiders and hence given the convenient label of "unpredictable." It is my belief that they have their own, peculiarly Korean, way of doing things that lacks the diplomatic sophistication born of decades of dealing with western governments.
When left to their own devices, the two Koreas appear to understand each other in a way the US can never hope to. Recent history shows that much in the way of detente can be achieved - prime ministerial agreements, home visits by separated families, a meeting of the two leaders, a certain amount of economic openness by the North towards South Korean business, and even the development of a railway line across the 38th parallel - when the two Koreas put their minds to it.
But when nuclear weapons are involved, the rest of the world takes an interest, to the evident relief of South Korea. Anyway, restarting the Yongbyon reactor and expelling the international nuclear observers was a desperate gesture directed at the world at large, and principally the US. Almost certainly the North Koreans need something - food aid, oil, talks, who knows? And if they didn't resort to such drastic measures, would anyone take any notice?
Of course, the US bombers never came, and I am here now to tell tales of perhaps the strangest fortnight of my seven years in North Korea, when the daytime was punctuated by anti-US rallies and meetings to denounce imperialism, and the night was spent dodging unlit vehicles and temporary military checkpoints. My lasting impression, however, is of a brief sense of camaraderie, enjoyed in a country where foreigners are kept at arm's length; even the bombers, it seemed, were supposed to know about our special foreigners' compound since there was apparently never the need for us to take refuge in the metro. Pointing this out to colleagues proved to be a misplaced attempt at levity since for the people of North Korea the threat of attack is never a matter to joke about, not then and, I am sure, not now.
I say this because once again, it seems, the country is on a war footing. The army has been put on alert, there has been a mass mobilisation of reservists and, no doubt, mass rallies and meetings are being held to denounce the "US imperialists and their lackeys." And that's not where the similarities end between the situation then and now. There is a depressing familiarity to the reasons for the current tension. Back in 1991, the newly-installed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army, Kim Jong Il, declared the state of semi-war in response to the US's resumption of its annual Team Spirit "war games" in South Korea (which had been suspended the previous year as a goodwill gesture). The US had taken this provocative step because of its concerns over North Korea's nuclear programme.
That the US forces in the South hold these exercises, and indeed the very fact that there are any US servicemen there at all, is a lingering insult to North Korean pride. "The greatest desire of all the Korean nation," so a constant refrain of North Korean propaganda goes, "is the reunification of the peninsula." It's a dream that is clearly unattainable, so the logic would have it, as long as the US maintains forces in the South ready to embark on another war. And there, in a nutshell, you have the cause of North Korean antipathy. The US is accused of the remarkable double perfidy back in 1950 of starting the Korean War and then halting the North Korean onslaught that would have reunified the peninsula. As if that wasn't bad enough, they are now perpetuating the division while awaiting the moment to repeat the invasion of half a century ago.
These are the facts as taught to North Koreans from a very young age. It is instilled in them constantly that their country has only ever been the victim of powerful enemies: the Japanese in the first half of the 20th century (whose harsh treatment of the Korean people justifies considerable complaint) and then the Americans. It may be a tall order for foreigners to accept the fact that the US started the Korean War (or rather, the Glorious Fatherland Liberation War), but once this leap of faith has been taken, then it becomes much easier to see the US peace-keeping forces in South Korea for what they are; an army of occupation holding regular war games aimed at another invasion of the North.
As they grow older the schoolchildren will learn more of US arrogance and duplicity. Every day the newspapers carry reports of the latest violations of North Korean airspace by the US air force, and editorials condemn statements by US officials perceived as anti-North Korea. A large part of North Korea's prolific film output is devoted to tales of heroism during the Korean War. (I can speak with some authority on this, having played the role of an aide to General MacArthur in one movie).
The country's economic plight can be blamed on the Americans - the need for constant vigilance against attack is the reason for spending almost a quarter of GDP on defence. It doesn't take much imagination to realise that the Americans are responsible also for the food shortages that have afflicted the country, since the US was a party to the decision to divide the Korean peninsula in 1945, which bequeathed the bulk of the fertile land to the people south of the 38th parallel, while their fellow countrymen in the north were left to scratch out a living from land that is 80% covered by mountains.
It's a propaganda onslaught that has proved highly effective among the population at large. Of the handful of Americans who made it into the country during my time there (the authorities rarely permitted visits by US citizens), one had learned very quickly to tell people he was Canadian; another, by not denying his nationality, risked being refused service in restaurants and was regularly subjected to vitriolic attacks by people, even strangers, who were outraged by his government's crimes against Korea.
So what relevance does all this have to the situation now, when yet again North Korea and the US are at daggers drawn over Pyongyang's nuclear intentions? First, those who advocate military attack on the North would do well to consider that every North Korean receives regular military training, and armed with the mighty ideological weapon of fighting for a just cause, they will prove a formidable enemy. The anti-Americanism that binds these people together is merely strengthened when their country is branded as part of the "Axis of Evil" and threatened with attack. There's no possibility here of towns and villages turning out to welcome the GIs as liberators.
But there won't be a war. It's inconceivable that China, still mistrustful of the US and its military, would want anything of the sort on its border, and South Korea and Japan may also be wary of military conflict involving a cornered neighbour armed with sophisticated missiles that bring their territory well within range. So a compromise will be found - again - and the North will probably gain a few concessions. But then again, how many times can they play the same card hand? The problem is that a dangerous army and nuclear brinkmanship are their only trump cards, and when the attention of the international community wanders the leadership in Pyongyang has no other recourse for easing the plight of a cold and hungry population.
I learned long ago not to forecast how the North Korean government would react in certain situations or to interpret why they were doing what they did, their actions often being unfathomable to outsiders and hence given the convenient label of "unpredictable." It is my belief that they have their own, peculiarly Korean, way of doing things that lacks the diplomatic sophistication born of decades of dealing with western governments.
When left to their own devices, the two Koreas appear to understand each other in a way the US can never hope to. Recent history shows that much in the way of detente can be achieved - prime ministerial agreements, home visits by separated families, a meeting of the two leaders, a certain amount of economic openness by the North towards South Korean business, and even the development of a railway line across the 38th parallel - when the two Koreas put their minds to it.
But when nuclear weapons are involved, the rest of the world takes an interest, to the evident relief of South Korea. Anyway, restarting the Yongbyon reactor and expelling the international nuclear observers was a desperate gesture directed at the world at large, and principally the US. Almost certainly the North Koreans need something - food aid, oil, talks, who knows? And if they didn't resort to such drastic measures, would anyone take any notice?
