Józef Oleksy:
Will Poland be ready? We have to be
Poland, the laggard among candidate countries aspiring to join the European Union (EU) in two to three years, has a mountain of work to do in 2002 if it is to enter the Western economic and political bloc along with its peers. With just 12 months left to wrap up negotiations, Poland still needs to reach agreement with Brussels in 10 areas, no small task given that the most difficult points of discussion - agriculture, foreign land sales and regional development aid - are also the most politically and financially sensitive in capitals throughout Europe. Former Prime Minister Józef Oleksy, 55, is the head of the Sejm's European Committee and recalls the days a few years ago when Polish support for EU entry was unquestionable. Today, with unemployment climbing toward 18% and a number of seats in Parliament belonging to Euro-skeptic parties, it is up to Oleksy and his government to convince parliamentarians and citizens in a national referendum next year that joining the EU is the right thing to do. Last month Oleksy met with the Business Journal's Michael Leville to talk about the obstacles and challenges that lay ahead on Poland's path to the EU. The following is a translated, edited version of their conversation.
Q: Will Poland be ready to join the EU in 2004?
A: We consider it a strategic necessity and priority. (2004) is the optimal date for three reasons. First of all, all of the candidate countries are growing impatient; they have more negotiating chapters closed. The second reason is that in 2004 the EU will have (to undergo) important internal structural reforms, and it will be important (for Poland) to be inside the union when decisions are made about its future. The third reason is that the EU's future budget will be (decided) around 2005, and you have to be a member state to have an influence on (that process). Also in 2004 are the European Parliament elections, and we want to participate in those elections because as a member we will have 50 seats for our deputies. Another reason is that Poland is still in a stage of transformation and (is facing) the hard task of transforming our economy and modernizing our state, and of course there are high costs (associated) with that. The sooner Poland is in the EU, the sooner it will profit from those funds. And as you probably know, there are already some funds in the EU for the candidate countries. In 2004 (new members will receive) E12 billion, in 2005 E14 billion and in 2006 E16 billion. These are funds we very much need.
Also, the dramatic events of Sept. 11 in America means that the integration process should be speeded up. Will Poland be ready? We have to be. Otherwise we will lose our chance. In 2004, only those candidate countries that have finished negotiations by the end of 2003 will be able to join the EU.
Q: How would you assess Poland's progress in negotiations in 2001?
A: It was less than we needed because during the French presidency (June-December 2000) we completed only two chapters, though we had planned on 11. So we were not very happy with (that). In the Belgian presidency we wanted to close six chapters, but we only closed three. That's why in the first half of 2002 we have to close seven chapters because in the second half of the year we will have three remaining chapters of crucial importance.
Q: How realistic is it to close seven chapters in the first half of the year?
A: The reality is more or less based on the fact that the negotiations for all of these chapters are advanced already and we know that it is realistic (to conclude them). But the main question is whether we will have sufficient time for the three remaining chapters. The chapters, agriculture, regional policy, and budget and finance. Because of the (coming) elections in France and Germany, it is impossible to talk about agriculture, (particularly) in France. In Germany, it is also clear that they have toughened up in the area of free movement of labor. So that's why for the tough issues, we have only half a year left. Keeping those dates will not only depend on us, but also on the flexibility of the member states and Brussels.
Q: How will the new anti-EU parties in Parliament affect the accession process for Poland?
A: First of all, the two really pro-European parties (Solidarity Election Action and the Freedom Union) lost the election (Sept. 23, 2001), and of the parties that won the election, one is completely anti-European (the League of Polish Families [LPR]), two are Euro-skeptical (Self-Defense [SO] and Law and Justice [PiS]), one is pro-European (Civic Platform [PO]), and the governing coalition (Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Peasants Party [PSL]) is also pro-European. One may argue that isn't good that the pro-European parties lost the election, but I think it isn't so bad that we have skeptical parties within the government because it gives us a chance to have more in-depth discussions about the issues.
Q: Do you think the anti-EU parties will be able to sway public opinion?
A: I don't think so. We will win the referendum. The anti-European parties simply don't have a viable alternative or proposal to offer. Their first proposal is to simply resign from the European Agreement and to renegotiate it. When I ask them what they want to renegotiate, they say they want to renegotiate in a way that will allow Poland to become sovereign. This is no proposition. The second proposal is an agreement with the United States based on NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). It would be very strange for Poland to be a member of NAFTA because as an institution, NAFTA is incomparable to the EU. A third proposal is to make a free-trade region of some kind - so they don't have proposals. This is why I think we will win the referendum. But the crucial thing will be the level of participation. Because in the Constitution, we have to have 50% plus one vote for the referendum to be positive. This is a problem. We'll see. I think we have a great deal of work to do because the knowledge of Europe in Poland is small. And this is also true in society and in the economic sphere. I often meet with representatives of business associations and I ask them, do you know yet how you should prepare for the internal market? Do you know how the conditions of competition will change? Do you know what standards you will have to meet inside the EU?' And after such meetings I'm not always very optimistic because the level of knowledge is poor. Just this morning I had a meeting with about 300 young people from around the country and I asked them to raise their hands if they are already convinced Poland should join the EU. The majority of them raised their hands, but not all of them. And these are kids who belong to European clubs, so there's still a lot of work to do. The government is aware of this. I, as the president of the most important committee in Parliament, want a platform for discussion of, and arguing about, European issues because the worst thing is when nothing happens. The committee is very much pluralistic. I have seven vice chairman, and of those, four are Euro-skeptics.
Q: Recent surveys suggest that only about 51% of Poles are in favor of joining the EU. Why is support limited?
A: Because there were mistakes in the past. First of all, when Poland signed the European Association agreement in 1994, it seemed obvious that society supported membership. The Solidarity elite thought that the wish to have democracy was inevitably linked with joining the union; this was obvious. But after some time, those two factors became spread out. Secondly, the transformation process was hard. In many people's lives, things became worse or turned bad. And politicians often argued that we have to do this because the EU expects it of us. This was not clever, and very often it was simply not true. But because it was explained in this way, people started thinking that everything bad in their lives was linked with the EU. Thirdly, the EU was presented to the public as a source of well-being only. No one talked about the balance between the costs and benefits of membership. Before, there was only an idealistic view of the union and when people started to see the costs linked with accession, they became bitter and disappointed. I should also say something about the Catholic church; its role is quite important.
Q: Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz survived a vote of confidence in December. Do you think introducing the government's negotiation position in Brussels before it came out in Warsaw was the right thing to do?
A: The whole thing was exaggerated. Cimoszewicz didn't do anything contrary to the will of government. But we had some information (leaks), which I called a small accident,' in terms of information. For historical reasons, land issues are treated more sensitively here than in the Czech Republic or Hungary, and that's why we have to avoid such small mistakes in the future. But we have a problem with the European Union on that issue; the length of the transition period. We had a problem within the government coalition; the Peasants Party made that issue the most important thing.
Let me tell you that the EU is negotiating with other countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia. They are small countries with small problems. And they have agreed with the EU on some conditions concerning transition periods, which are small. (Meanwhile), they're making negotiations with Poland longer, and afterward they say we've already agreed on those matters with the other countries and we cannot make any exceptions for you. Suddenly, Poland becomes a problem. Slovakia has 5 million inhabitants, Slovenia 3 million, so the agreements reached on agriculture, for example, have nothing to do with the agreements that Poland will have to negotiate.
Q: As Poland moves to negotiate the most sensitive topics, do you think the anti-EU rhetoric will get even stronger?
A: I don't think so, but it would be better to hold a referendum when Poland is on sound financial footing; in a good economic situation. People would then be more ready to follow the government.
Q: But unemployment is set to top 18% in the second half of 2002.
A: Unfortunately, unemployment will continue to grow throughout 2002, but we hope that when we approach the time of the referendum, economic growth will be present. I also think that by that time there will have been a great effort (to inform the public about the EU).
Q: Does the government have an information campaign prepared?
A: Yes. The government is working on that, and very soon there will be a plenipotentiary for informing citizens on EU matters. And also in Parliament, there will be an intensification of the information process. Also, the NGOs (non-governmental organizations) are important, as is the entire educational system. I think that we will even try to gain the cooperation of the church, because it is not about a question of propaganda. It's a question about forming an argument and allowing people to make up their own minds. Some people ask me what the conditions are for leaving the union, and I just answer that we haven't even acceded yet, and you're thinking about leaving? But the information process doesn't concern only Poland. It also depends on the EU. The social stereotypes are present on both sides. When I talk to the social democratic parties inside the union, I ask them to try to persuade the inhabitants of their countries. Today 65% of Austrian society is against (European Union expansion). In Germany it's more than 50%. The social side of enlargement is not only the problem of the candidate countries.
Q: What are your greatest concerns about EU membership?
A: My first concrete concern is about Poland's ability to make full use of the funds available from the EU. The EU assigns funding provided the recipient countries are able to co-finance projects. This is a problem because we have an enormous budget gap, about $20 billion. I'm also worried about the possibility that the EU will make reforms to agriculture and regional policy that will lead to smaller fund transfers to countries like Poland. The thing is that during the Lisbon council the EU agreed that the share of the union budget in terms of GDP would not exceed 1.27%, while a few months later in Helsinki, it was said that enlargement would not include six countries but 12. First the financial limits were fixed, then they enlarged the group of candidate countries, so the same funds had to suffice for a larger number of countries. The third problem is what shape the EU will take after enlargement and how the small interest groups will be formed and how they will interact. Lastly, we have to think about the two options: a federal Europe or a Europe of nation states.
Q: Which do you prefer?
A: I must say that I've been thinking about this personally and my committee will be inspiring public debate on the issue. After the negotiations, this is the most important thing for us to think about. I think that it will be a long time before a nation state is not a basis of identification for people. I cannot imagine a concept of Europe without those countries having their identities. So my conception would be a federation of nation states with strong supranational institutions. That's why 2004 is so important because among the four other important issues it has the competence treaty to be dealt with, so the limitation of powers between the supranational bodies, on the level of the member states, and on the regional level, which is very important. Because you have many concepts fighting with each other in a way. For example, you have the concept of regions, with a strong center in Brussels. But in that concept the nation state is only in the background. Again, I'm for a federation of nation states with strong supranational institutions. Maybe a United States of Europe. The core of the European Community was for a common way of doing things. It was for a common market, law, institutions and policies. I think that in the future, common politics will play a far more important role. For instance, in the near future Europe will have to have a common philosophy of development, a common policy toward development, unemployment ... in other words, building a modern infrastructure on the chaos of the EU. The union also has to have a common foreign security policy.
The third element is the Europeanization of Russia. Russian-European integration - I think that Russia will build some new links with Europe. The EU, when thinking about its future, has to be aware of another big identity across its borders, which is Russia.
Q: Can you imagine the EU expanding without Poland?
A: No, it wouldn't be serious. What would be the point of expanding the EU then? The real challenge is to expand with Poland. If the EU tried to make a sort of half step, it would be a mistake. It would be proof that the EU was unable to go beyond its own comfort level, so it would be difficult to consider that. Also because there's the point of view that expanding eastward is of common interest, and not only for the benefit of Poland. The problem is elsewhere. The EU has already in a way consumed those benefits, but Poland is not yet in the union. The Polish market is already open and we still don't have reciprocity.
Roseanne Gerin