NATO: What next?
The internal machinations of U.S. politics won out, however, and the vote is now expected to taker place toward the end of April. Although a disappointment, the delay is not really a defeat for Polish diplomacy: Most analysts expect a successful vote, although further delay cannot be ruled out. Polish membership in NATO is inevitable. Now, Polish foreign and defense policy analysts are asking a more interesting question: What comes after Polish membership is agreed, and after Poland becomes a fully fledged member in 1999? What sort of NATO member will Poland be, and what sort of political choices will it have to be making in its new geopolitical role as a NATO front-line state?
Poland's foreign policy-makers will have to face three broad policy questions which are new to Poland. The first question will be Poland's policy balance toward the United States and Europe within the alliance. There is an ongoing policy debate as to the desired level of the U.S. presence in Europe, and indeed the debate about the nature of NATO expansion was also a debate about U.S. influence: hence the position of France in seeking a rapid expansion of the southern tier of NATO in order to water down what it rightly perceived to be an influence of pro-U.S. Central Europeans. Last week's visit to Poland of the secretary-general of the Western European Union, Jose Cutileiro, was a signal that soon Poland will be a participant in the debate over the desirability of strengthening the European defense pillar of NATO, and the developing ambitions of the European Union (EU) to possess its separate defense and foreign policy identity. Poland's geographical position means that inevitably it will seek a balance, although the ineffectiveness of EU foreign policy strategy in the Balkans is hardly a recommendation for entrusting Polish security entirely in the hands of vacillating Europeans.
At the same time, historical experience will make Poland one of the most skeptical NATO members in terms of any moves to allow Russia to have an influence in internal NATO matters, such as through the NATO-Russia Council. Put simply, Poles feel that NATO membership should be a tool of extricating the country from Russian regional influence, not a mechanism for its reintroduction through the back door. Overall, the Polish debate about how to handle the balance among European, U.S. and Russian influences on the European continental land mass will also be a debate about the future role of NATO itself: a continued political instrument of "keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," or its evolution into a more nebulous instrument of "collective security" with a woolly agenda of combating every conceivable threat short of muggers of old ladies.
Poland's second NATO-generated foreign policy challenge will be the role it will find for itself as NATO's front-line state in the East. That means Poland must take a position on the issue of further NATO expansion to the east, not only to countries like Slovenia and Romania, but also toward the Baltic states, as well as facing the issue of closer NATO-Ukraine ties. It is in the interest of the Poles to see the expansion process continue, but Polish diplomacy will soon realize that at that point it will face provoking tension not only with Russia, but also with some NATO allies, as well as generating problems for any U.S. administration that will at the same time want to maintain bipartisan political support for U.S. foreign policy.
Finally, the Poles within NATO will have the opportunity, if they so choose, to be leaders of regional security within Central Europe. It is often forgotten that as a NATO member, Poland will have three potentially unstable neighbors on its borders, dominated by unpredictable and militaristic political forces: Belarussia, Slovakia and the Kaliningrad region. Poland may soon realize that NATO needs the Poles as much as the Poles need NATO to generate credible defense and security strategy toward these countries and regions. That may well provide the Poles with the leverage they need to take the security lead also in relation to the Czechs and the Hungarians.
Of course, NATO membership will involve significant decisions in domestic policy as well and provoke speedier reforms of the Polish military and Polish defense industry than might otherwise have occurred. One particular area to look out for is the positive effect that NATO will have in improving the credibility of Poland's intelligence services and the new security rigors that the need for intelligence-sharing will bring in the workings of Poland's secret services. But in many ways, the choice is being made for the Poles. In the area of foreign policy, Poland will soon realize that NATO membership, far from limiting Polish sovereignty, will create new opportunities for her exercising significant choices in foreign and defense policy. Ultimately of course, whether Poland makes those choices intelligently will be a question of the quality of domestic policy elites and their foreign policy vision, and that remains a separate story.
Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw Director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed on cecgr@ikp.atm.com.pl
Poland's foreign policy-makers will have to face three broad policy questions which are new to Poland. The first question will be Poland's policy balance toward the United States and Europe within the alliance. There is an ongoing policy debate as to the desired level of the U.S. presence in Europe, and indeed the debate about the nature of NATO expansion was also a debate about U.S. influence: hence the position of France in seeking a rapid expansion of the southern tier of NATO in order to water down what it rightly perceived to be an influence of pro-U.S. Central Europeans. Last week's visit to Poland of the secretary-general of the Western European Union, Jose Cutileiro, was a signal that soon Poland will be a participant in the debate over the desirability of strengthening the European defense pillar of NATO, and the developing ambitions of the European Union (EU) to possess its separate defense and foreign policy identity. Poland's geographical position means that inevitably it will seek a balance, although the ineffectiveness of EU foreign policy strategy in the Balkans is hardly a recommendation for entrusting Polish security entirely in the hands of vacillating Europeans.
At the same time, historical experience will make Poland one of the most skeptical NATO members in terms of any moves to allow Russia to have an influence in internal NATO matters, such as through the NATO-Russia Council. Put simply, Poles feel that NATO membership should be a tool of extricating the country from Russian regional influence, not a mechanism for its reintroduction through the back door. Overall, the Polish debate about how to handle the balance among European, U.S. and Russian influences on the European continental land mass will also be a debate about the future role of NATO itself: a continued political instrument of "keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," or its evolution into a more nebulous instrument of "collective security" with a woolly agenda of combating every conceivable threat short of muggers of old ladies.
Poland's second NATO-generated foreign policy challenge will be the role it will find for itself as NATO's front-line state in the East. That means Poland must take a position on the issue of further NATO expansion to the east, not only to countries like Slovenia and Romania, but also toward the Baltic states, as well as facing the issue of closer NATO-Ukraine ties. It is in the interest of the Poles to see the expansion process continue, but Polish diplomacy will soon realize that at that point it will face provoking tension not only with Russia, but also with some NATO allies, as well as generating problems for any U.S. administration that will at the same time want to maintain bipartisan political support for U.S. foreign policy.
Finally, the Poles within NATO will have the opportunity, if they so choose, to be leaders of regional security within Central Europe. It is often forgotten that as a NATO member, Poland will have three potentially unstable neighbors on its borders, dominated by unpredictable and militaristic political forces: Belarussia, Slovakia and the Kaliningrad region. Poland may soon realize that NATO needs the Poles as much as the Poles need NATO to generate credible defense and security strategy toward these countries and regions. That may well provide the Poles with the leverage they need to take the security lead also in relation to the Czechs and the Hungarians.
Of course, NATO membership will involve significant decisions in domestic policy as well and provoke speedier reforms of the Polish military and Polish defense industry than might otherwise have occurred. One particular area to look out for is the positive effect that NATO will have in improving the credibility of Poland's intelligence services and the new security rigors that the need for intelligence-sharing will bring in the workings of Poland's secret services. But in many ways, the choice is being made for the Poles. In the area of foreign policy, Poland will soon realize that NATO membership, far from limiting Polish sovereignty, will create new opportunities for her exercising significant choices in foreign and defense policy. Ultimately of course, whether Poland makes those choices intelligently will be a question of the quality of domestic policy elites and their foreign policy vision, and that remains a separate story.
Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw Director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed on cecgr@ikp.atm.com.pl
