The long downward slope

After every election, all governments have a honeymoon period during which voters are inclined to give the new team the benefit of the doubt and to extend their support even when promises made at election time are not delivered instantly. In the case of former Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek's government it was not really until the beginning of 1999 that the erosion of the government's support became clear in the opinion polls, after which there was a steady decline until Solidarity Election Action (AWS) reached a mere 5% in the polls. When Leszek Miller took his place as prime minister last September, it was at the head of a government that had been elected with unprecedented support in democratic Poland. Despite the country's proportional representation election system, Miller's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) party had almost managed to secure an overall majority in Parliament. Over the subsequent few months, support for the SLD-led government held up well in the polls, at around 47-48% despite inauspicious slip-ups and seeming lack of coordination between ministers, with opposition parties trailing in the low teens in percentage terms. Last week, however, the first real sign emerged that popular support for the government might be cracking: A national poll showed a massive 12% drop in support during one month, down to 35%. Still a very strong reading, but also the first sign that from now on, it would be performance, not promises, that will determine the government's popularity.

In retrospect, it is no surprise that the support for the government has started to crack. As mentioned, one of the surprising hallmarks of the Miller government has been its capacity for self-inflicted errors. There have been a series of minor scandals involving suspicions of irregularities over the finances of top politicians. And in the past few weeks, it has been Poland's negotiations with the European Union that have caused the greatest tensions, both inside and outside the coalition government. The Polish voter does not like to see divided governments, and that was precisely what he saw a couple of weeks ago with the protests by the Polish Peasants Party (PSL), the junior coalition partner, about the government's negotiating position toward the EU on agriculture. More ominously, the voting public is increasingly beginning to feel the effects of the government's proposed internal reforms. One example is the new proposal by the Finance Ministry to make it less attractive for retirees to work, thus opening up the labor market to younger people. A second proposal by the government to reduce the numbers of medicines refunded by the state means that many people who need foreign drugs will end up paying more. Overall, the aim of saving money is laudable but for many this makes the shift from the rhetoric of reform to the hard reality of "no pain, no gain."

There is no indication, either, that erosion of the government's support will not continue. One of Miller's key themes upon taking office was the goal of reducing unemployment quickly. Now, just over six months since the elections, it is clearer than ever that this goal will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Poland's demographics mean that even with moderate growth, unemployment will keep on rising. That will have the effect of making the prime minister appear to lack credibility but it will also foment potential opposition to the government both inside and outside Parliament. The inability to reduce unemployment will be grist to the mill of populist parties, such as the radical Self-Defense (SO) movement, and it will also generate the prospect of protests and demonstrations by the Solidarity trade union, anxious to return to the public stage after its drubbing in last year's elections. This in turn will likely further throw into relief the latent tension within the government between those ministers and officials closer to Finance Minister Marek Belka and other advisers and ministers who tend to favor a short-term solution of deficit-financed reflationary policies as a way of achieving growth quickly. And it may well once again revive the public conflict between the government and the National Bank of Poland and Monetary Policy Council (RPP) over interest rate policies. So, the inevitable challenge of increasing unemployment and the demand for growth will lead to political tensions and conflicts that will inevitably cause a decline in support. In the background, of course, will be the second strategic policy goal that Miller has set himself and the government: that of ensuring Poland's entry into the EU by 2004. As negotiations come to a close the realities of accession become clearer to various social groups, providing new ammunition to the radical opposition parties such as the SO and the League of Polish Families. Yet Miller will be aware that over the next three years, he will be facing electoral tests in each of them: local elections in 2002, a referendum on Europe in 2003, European elections in 2004 and parliamentary elections in 2005. As each electoral date approaches, he will face the dilemma of shoring up short-term political support against the need to pursue polices on the economy and Europe that are good for Poland but which in the short term might cost him votes.

The distinguishing feature of Miller's government against that of Buzek is and will be the degree of control exerted by the prime minister over policy in the short and long terms. For that reason too, the decision as to how to resolve this dilemma will largely be Miller's alone. And it is by that decision that he ultimately will be judged and remembered.

Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl