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They're back

When Prime Minister Leszek Miller created his government last year with just two Polish Peasants Party (PSL) ministers, many hoped that the fractious experiences of the previous coalition government between the PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) were a thing of the past. In 2001, Miller had hoped not to have formed a coalition government at all, expecting that the SLD would gain an overall majority. Parliamentary arithmetic forced his hand in the end, but he still expected that the relatively weaker showing of the PSL at the elections would make them a much more supine partner. Yet the experiences of the past week indicate that that expectation might have been premature, and that the PSL may yet prove a major thorn in his side. The 1993-1997 coalition governments were a catalog of infighting and open public rivalry between the two parties, which cost them dearly in the 1997 elections. The then-PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak was initially prime minister between 1993 and 1995, and after he was forced to resign he was constantly fomenting rearguard activity against his senior SLD coalition partner. The PSL also became the b×te-noir of foreign investors, publicly proposing illiberal economic policies and promoting state intervention in the economy. Miller's tactic after the 2001 elections was to try to limit the PSL's influence by offering them only two ministerial positions - agriculture and environment - and by building up relations with Andrzej Lepper's populist Self-Defense (SO) party, rivals of the PSL for the rural vote. Initially the strategy seemed to be working, with the PSL meekly accepting major reversals of its election promises, such as the expected introduction of an import tax. Over the last couple of weeks, however, the PSL has re-emerged as a player publicly flexing its political muscles with the prospect of making real trouble for the Miller government. In a series of votes in Parliament, the PSL openly voted against the SLD on politically crucial legislation. First, it sided with the parliamentary opposition to force through amendments to a new law on local elections that would introduce a voting system more favorable to the PSL than the SLD and also to delay local elections until the autumn. The SLD had wanted elections in the late spring, mainly to avoid any slippage of its vote over the summer as Poland's economic woes continue to bite. Second, the PSL voted with the opposition to prevent SLD-sponsored changes to the so-called lustration or vetting law, established to weed out former collaborators of the communist secret services in public life. If the PSL-backed amendments go through Parliament, it will mean that ongoing trials of senior SLD politicians for breaking the lustration law will continue. Several of those on trial are close Miller allies. Last week, the PSL decided to open up a second front by vocally protesting the decision by the European Union (EU) not to provide to Polish farmers the full range of subsidies afforded to their Western European counterparts. In a surprise move, the EU announced that it would not be until 10 years after membership (planned for 2004) that Polish farmers would be entitled to the full range of subsidies. PSL leader and Agriculture Minister Jarosław Kalinowski immediately called the offer "wholly unacceptable" and pledged to fight the proposal, stating that he was unsure whether with such an offer on the table he would be able to support a "yes" vote in a proposed EU membership referendum in 2003. Although Miller also voiced his concerns, of even greater concern to him must be the prospect of the PSL failing to support a referendum at a time when he has made it his personal ambition to be the prime minister who finally leads Poland into the EU. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that relations between the two parties are at a particularly low ebb. Why the change in atmosphere? First, the SLD has lost much of its leverage over the PSL with the collapse in credibility of the SO movement. With the parliamentary immunity of its leader, Andrzej Lepper, against prosecution now lifted, and the inevitability of a string of convictions against him on a range of public order charges, the SLD is now completely dependent on the PSL for maintaining itself in power. That fundamental reversal of power puts the PSL back in its role as political kingmaker, which it played so effectively in the 1993-1997 Parliament. Second, there is the factor of internal political pressures within the PSL itself. Its current leader Jarosław Kalinowski has been the object of criticism within the party for being too weak in negotiations with the SLD, and he is facing increasing internal opposition from such politicians as Janusz Piechociński. Standing up to the SLD is the easiest way for Kalinowski to restore his inner-party credentials and stymie a potential revolt against his leadership. Third, and most fundamentally, the PSL is facing an important strategic choice, with the key date being that of the expected EU referendum in the autumn of 2003. If by that time the EU has not made substantial concessions on the key issue of land purchases and agricultural subsidies, the PSL will be hard-pressed to be a member of a government that is agitating for a "yes" vote in the country. That would provoke a hemorrhaging of the PSL vote to the SO movement or to the radical right. Thus the PSL will push the Miller government as much as it can, by overt and covert threats, to stand up to the EU. But if push comes to shove, and the government in the eyes of the Polish peasant capitulates, then expect the PSL to be exiting the government in the spring of 2003. That prospect would of course spell political disaster for Miller: heading up a minority government and facing humiliation in a national referendum with the prospect of a further two years in office. No wonder he was furious at the PSL's new behavior. When becoming prime minister he had hoped for a stable government and smooth passage to the EU; now, he is faced with the prospect of neither. Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw Director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl

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