When the talking has to stop
President George Bush's visit to Warsaw last week reaffirmed the degree to which Polish-U.S. relations remain the central concern of Polish politicians and the current government. It is worth bearing in mind that for the first time, a U.S. president came to Poland as an ally, not merely a political or cultural symbol. Previous visits, even including that of Bill Clinton in 1994, were an opportunity for Poles to display their affections toward the values represented by the U.S. Now, following Polish membership in NATO, the Bush visit was a chance to talk practical politics, and how the two countries ought to be working together on the main challenges to the geopolitical landscape.
Most of the topics that were high on Bush's agenda were part of the broader context of Poland's place in NATO, and the way that the alliance ought to be moving in the future. The answer to that question is of crucial importance because it will largely determine the degree to which the U.S. will remain as engaged in Europe as it has done in the past. As the U.S. sees it, there are three main questions to be answered, and in each case to the concern of some Poland has yet to give clear answers.
Take the first issue, Nuclear Missile Defense (NMD). Here, the Bush argument seems pretty clear. Since the end of the Cold War, and the end of the threat of direct nuclear assault by Russia against the United States, the West's main focus of protection against nuclear weapons has shifted to the need to defend itself against attack by rogue states, capable of firing one or two ballistic missiles against the U.S. or her allies. So Bush has been trying to get European support for the idea of constructing a missile shield, which he needs because of the requirement to place special radars in Europe to detect missile firings. Poland has been sending mixed signals. In the last couple of weeks, Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski spoke enthusiastically about the plan, whereas at a recent summit of defense ministers Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski counseled against moves that would disrupt NATO unity. Likewise, at last week's NATO summit in Brussels President Aleksander Kwasniewski also walked a middle path between supporting Poland's strategic ally and mollifying European sensibilities.
A similar ambiguity has recently emerged in discussions over the second key aspect of the Bush agenda, namely the evolving nature of the nascent European Security and Defense Identity. The last couple of years have seen a concerted effort by the European Union (EU) to build up separate military structures of its own that in the long run may compete with, rather than cooperate with, those of NATO. Despite protests to the contrary, the strategic goal of some especially France seems to be to slowly ease the U.S. out of European security arrangements, and look to developing stronger relations on an EU-Russia axis. The Poles, of course, are privately horrified, and are opposed to this trend, all the more so since being outside the EU and on the basis of the current chaos over the Nice Treaty, not likely to join in the near future their voice in this new European arrangement would be limited. Thus far, however, they have been publicly unable to come out in opposing the EU plans, preferring the line that a strong EU defense identity is desirable, as long as it does not threaten NATO unity a view that many see as indefensible in the long run. The position of the Poles is unenviable, since at every step of the way Polish politicians are fearful of saying anything that would cause offense to the EU and worsen relations at a crucial point in their EU accession negotiating process.
The third strategic challenge to NATO, namely further eastward expansion, is one where there is the least ambiguity in the Polish position. The Poles have firmly believed that NATO should continue to expand eastward, to include at least the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as Slovakia and Slovenia. Ideally expansion would include Bulgaria and Romania as well. Such an expansion would lessen Poland's geostrategic exposure, as well as strengthening the alliance by eliminating the "gaps" in its architecture. Yet, paradoxically, if there will be cause for discussion between Poland and the U.S. on this score, it will be less about the Poles' verbal commitment to this strategic goal, and more about practical shortcomings in helping it come about. The U.S. government is interested in demonstrating to its allies and to Congress that expansion strengthens, and does not weaken, the alliance. Part of that involves showing that new member states like Poland have performed well in the first couple of years of membership.
Last week's visit, perhaps more than anything else, probably brought home to both Bush and the Poles themselves that in the real world of alliances and shifting geopolitics, emotions and values can easily compete with interests. Whether this dissonance will grow or contract in the future is in the hands of the next Polish government. Bush has staked out the issues: Prime Minister Leszek Miller will have to provide the answers.
Marek Matraszek is the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations. He can be e-mailed at director@cec.com.pl (mailto:director@cec.com.pl)
